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REPLY BRIEF ON MAIN APPEAL 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
Despite the length of Brown's rambling Response Brief, the 
issues at the heart of this appeal are simple and straightforward. 
In Brown I, this Court concluded that Richards had prevailed on 
virtually every major issue raised on appeal and was entitled to 
attorneys fees as the prevailing party. This Court determined that 
the 70% attorneys fees awarded to Richards were not supported by 
adequate findings and it remanded the case to the trial judge for 
the purpose of making and entering the supporting findings. On 
remand, the court directed the parties "to make their respective 
evidentiary showings of reasonable fees as outlined in this 
opinion." Browr I, 840 P. 2d at 157. 
After a significant expenditure of time and funds, Richards 
submitted voluminous evidence and summary documentation of 
allocated attorneys fees between fee compensable and non-
compensable claims for relief. See Addendum I of this Brief. The 
parties then participated in over 5 days of evidentiary hearings. 
It is now clear that Brown never submitted any affirmative evidence 
which challenged Richards1 fee allocation. Thus, when the trial 
judge took the matter under advisement in February 1995, the only 
detailed and specific allocation of attorneys fees was the evidence 
of Richards. 
Almost 2 years later, Judge Rigtrup broke the court's silence 
and, upon retirement, issued a December 31, 1996 Minute Entry 
purporting to award and allocate attorneys fees to Richards. 
1 
Instead of pursuing this Court's directions on remand and 
assimilating the evidence and expert testimony adduced by Richards 
in the evidentiary hearings, the trial judge simply made up a 
multiplier of 35% of the fees requested by Richards, an unsupported 
multiplier which was just one-half of the earlier, unsupported 
multiplier applied by the trial court in Brown If 840 P.2d. This 
"gut feeling" approach was as inadequate and legally unsupported as 
it was in the earlier approach which resulted in remand. 
As demonstrated by Brown's Response Brief, the trial judge 
eliminated from the fee award to Richards all evidence relating to 
the proof of Brown's fraud, even though this Court expressly 
recognized that such evidence was part of Richards' successful 
failure of substantial performance defense against Brown's 
Interwest contract claim. Further, it is equally clear that the 
trial judge eliminated fees relating to substantial evidence 
proving Richards' affirmative breach of warranty claim because of 
the commonality of facts with Richards' fraud evidence. The latter 
was both a defense to Brown's Interwest contact claim and the 
affirmative fraud counterclaim. In doing so, the trial judge 
erred. Brown's Response Brief only serves to underscore that 
error. 
The trial court has had two opportunities to prepare adequate 
findings on attorneys fees and has failed here as it failed 
initially in Brown I, 840 P.2d. This Court should remand this case 
with directions for the trial court to modify its prior judgment 
and enter expedited findings based upon the evidentiary record 
2 
already made. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE UNDERLYING PREMISES OF BROWN'S ARGUMENTS ARE FLAWED. IT 
IS NOW CLEAR THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE FUNDAMENTALLY ERRED IN 
ESTIMATING THE AWARD OF RICHARDS' ATTORNEYS FEES. 
Brown's arguments, presented both in response to Richards1 
appeal and in support of Brown's appeal, arise primarily from the 
following three erroneous premises: 
1. Richards failed to allocate attorneys fees between 
recoverable and non-recoverable claims, as required by 
this Court; 
2. Richards is not entitled to an award of attorneys fees 
for prevailing on his fraud and other substantial 
performance defense of Brown's Interwest contract claims, 
but is limited only to fees for prevailing on his 
affirmative breach of warranty claim; and 
3. Richards' evidentiary proof of his breach of warranty 
claim was separate and distinct from proof of his 
contract defense and affirmative fraud claim. 
All three arguments are flawed, and Brown's positions, both on 
appeal and cross-appeal, must be rejected. 
A. Richards Properly Allocated His Attorneys Fees Between 
Fee Compensable and Non-Compensable Claims, 
Brown makes the astonishing argument that on remand, Richards 
failed to allocate his attorneys fees between fee compensable and 
non-compensable claims as directed by this Court. Brown Ir 840 P. 2d 
at 157. He further alleges that counsel's billing practices 
3 
rendered it impossible to allocate time properly. Based upon this 
alleged "failure to allocate," Brown asks this Court to reverse 
Richardsf award of attorneys fees and to deny Richards' fees 
altogether. These arguments are without merit to the point of 
being frivolous. 
1. Richards1 Counsel Kept Detailed and Adequate Time 
Records. 
Brown first asserts that Richards1 counsel kept poor time 
records because they failed to assign every task performed to a 
particular claim. Had Richards done so, Brown argues, allocation 
would have been simple, a "mathematical function" requiring minimal 
allocation. Brown Br. at 23. 
As a threshold observation, there is absolutely no precedent 
requiring that a lawyer undertake Brown's onerous and unrealistic 
billing practice. Neither this Court nor the Utah Supreme Court 
has ever suggested that attorneys must record their time so that 
each task and effort performed must be mechanically assigned at the 
time to a specific claim in a multiple claim or complex case. 
Instead, the sole requirement for the recovery of attorneys fees is 
that the particular and total time incurred be reasonably allocated 
between fee compensable and non-compensable claims. See e.g.
 f 
Cottonwood Mall v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266 (Utah 1992); Selvage v. 
Johnson, 910 P.2d 1252 (Utah App. 1996); Brown I at 143. Even the 
trial court below found that Brown's theoretical billing standard 
was unrealistic and impossible: 
Defendants' counsel did not allocate time 
based on individual claims because of the 
impracticality of doing so. It would be 
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difficult if not impossible in many instances 
to know how efforts made might relate to one 
claim or another. 
See, Appellant's Addendum "C" at p. 3 J 3. 
Brown also argues that Richards inappropriately engaged in 
"block billing."1 Brown's argument entirely ignores the fact that 
for much of the relevant period, Richards' counsel had underlying 
base records of the amount of time spent on each task. In 
addition, Brown presents no evidence that daily totals for time 
billing was an inappropriate method of time keeping in 1985-1989. 
By contrast, Richards provided unrefuted testimony from Harold G. 
Christiansen and Richards' counsel, Mr. Campbell, that Richards' 
billing method was not only an accepted but an appropriate billing 
practice in complex commercial litigation in the late 1980's. 
2. Richards Did Make The Allocations Required By This 
Court. 
Brown further argues that Richards failed completely on remand 
to make the fee allocation as directed by this Court. This 
assertion is frivolous and even sanctionable. Utah R. App. P. 33. 
Richards submitted a highly detailed and very specific fee 
allocation.2 See R. 5117-56 and Supp. Add. 
*The phrase "block billing" refers to the general practice of 
recording a number of specific tasks performed during the day but 
applying listing only a daily total for time spent. 
2In direct contradiction of his assertion that Richards failed to 
allocate Brown offers selective examples of alleged misallocation. 
Brown Br. At 16-17. To begin with, Brown challenges Richards' 
inclusion of time spend preparing and deposing John Sharp. Sharp 
testified about Interwest's reputation and testified that Boyd 
Brown told charter pilots to disconnect the Hobbs meter, a devise 
which records the amount of time flown by an aircraft. The time 
recorded on the Hobbs meter determines when certain FAA required 
5 
Richards' Amended Judgment Memorandum separated his total fees 
and costs into fourteen categories, and then allocated the fees or 
costs in each category between the fee compensable claims 
(Richards1 successful contract defense and the breach of warranty 
claim) and the non-compensable claims. Supp. Add. The actual 
invoices were also provided to the trial court. Id. This offered 
evidence plainly demonstrates that Richards appropriately allocated 
fees.3 
B. Contrary To Brown7s Misguided Argument, Richards Is 
Entitled To Fees Incurred Not Only On His Breach Of 
Warranty Claim But Also On His Successful Defense To 
Brown's Contract Claims, 
This Court held clearly in Brown I
 f 840 P. 2d at 150, that 
Richards relied on the "fraud defense" as part of the "substantial 
performance "defense" in prevailing against Brown's Interwest 
maintenance must be performed. This testimony was relevant to the 
specific warranties that there were no undisclosed contingent 
liabilities and that the seller had observed and performed all of 
its obligations, as the conduct alleged was criminal. It also was 
relevant to the general warranty that no misrepresentations were 
made that Interwest had the best reputation of all the FBO's at the 
airport. The reputation testimony was relevant to Richards1 
substantial performance defense as one of the assets purchased by 
Richards was the goodwill. 
Brown also selectively complained that Richards improperly 
included in its fee request the time of Robert Campbell, Elizabeth 
Dunning and Franklin Smith for a two hour meeting, and two specific 
time entries of Elizabeth Dunning and Carolyn Cox. Richards 
included such time in his fee request because such conferences 
addressed the common factual basis of both fee compensable and non-
compensable claims. 
3Richards Amended Judgment Memorandum and accompanying affidavits 
set forth in a systematic manner the allocations made by Richards 
and the supporting reasons. See, Supp. Add. A. 
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contract claim. Accordingly, Richards was entitled to his fees for 
proving his fraud defense. Brown I
 f 840 P. 2d at 150, 154. 
Notwithstanding this Court's express ruling which is now the law of 
the case, Brown now argues that Richards is only entitled to fees 
in connection with his affirmative breach of warranty claim. Brown 
Br. at 38-40. In doing so, Brown contends that Richards is not 
entitled to fees incident to his substantial performance defense of 
Brown's Interwest contract claim, because Richards did not raise a 
substantial performance defense in his original pleadings. 
Not only was Richards substantial performance defense, 
including Brown's fraud, raised and incorporated in the pre-trial 
order (R. 5680) , the defense was expressly tried to the jury 
without objection, was submitted to the jury under a substantial 
performance instruction, and was incorporated in the special 
verdict form submitted to the jury, viz., whether Brown had 
substantially performed the Interwest contract. R. 2808-09. Brown 
not only failed to object to the jury instruction or special 
verdict form, he failed to raise the issue on appeal to this Court 
in Brown I. Brown cannot now claim in a subsequent second appeal, 
that Richards' substantial performance defense, including the fraud 
defense, was tried improperly and that Richards is not entitled to 
his attorneys fees for prevailing on that defense. State in re 
E.D. C.D.r C D . & W.D. v. E.J.P.. 876 P.2d 397, 402 (Utah App. 
1994) (Failure to make objections at trial waives right to raise 
issue on appeal); Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n., 945 P.2d 125, 
13 6 (Utah App. 1997)(same). 
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C. Contrary to Brown's Brief. Richards Is Entitled To His 
Fees Incurred On His Breach Of Warranty Claim, 
Brown argues that the trial judge correctly reduced Richards1 
fees incurred in connection with the breach of warranty 
counterclaim because the evidence "overlapped" between the 
counterclaim and the fraud claim. On the one hand, there is no 
dispute that this complex commercial litigation involved 
significant overlap between the common factual bases of the various 
claims. Indeed, virtually all the evidence Richards presented 
regarding Brown's misrepresentations, omissions and fraud and the 
difference between the quality and value of the assets promised and 
those actually delivered went not only to Richards1 substantial 
performance defense of the Interwest asset contract, but also to 
Richards1 affirmative breach of warranty counterclaim. 
On the other hand, there is no authority or law for the 
proposition that an evidentiary overlap between fee compensable and 
non-compensable claims means that fees connected to the overlap are 
non-compensable. The law is quite to the contrary. See Br. of App. 
at 28-32. Brown offers up selected examples of witnesses whose 
testimony allegedly went only to the fraud claim and not to the 
breach of warranty claim.4 Brown Br. at 42 n. 9. Where Brown 
4Brownfs argument as to the testimony of Steve Featherstone misses 
the mark. Featherstone's evidence went primarily to the value and 
condition of the contract assets and business, which testimony was 
relevant both to the substantial performance defense of the 
contract claim and the breach of warranty counterclaim. 
Accordingly, no attorney time in connection with that evidence was 
eliminated. Lawyer time as to the evidence of Boyd Brown and Don 
Wittke was eliminated, in part, because 30% thereof was expended on 
building contract issues rather than the asset contract. 
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notes that a number of witnesses testified on the Hobbs meter and 
Interwest's reputation, such testimony was relevant not only to 
Richards1 affirmative fraud claim, but also to Richards1 
affirmative breach of warranty claim and Richards1 fraud defense to 
Brown's Interwest's contract claim. 
Where there were instances in which the testimony related 
solely to the affirmative fraud claim, the attorneys fees relating 
to that evidence were eliminated from Richards' fee request. Supp. 
Add. p. 17-19. In addition, the time spent on evidence associated 
with Richards' other successful tort claim, such as Lee Brown's 
testimony, was eliminated as it went to a claim for which 
attorney's fees were not recoverable. R. 4745. 
Brown's theory appears to be that Richards' fraud evidence was 
distinct from his beach of warranty evidence because breach of 
warranty does not require proof of Brown's knowledge or motives, 
while fraud does. The answer to that argument, however, is that 
Richards' breach of warranty claim arose in part from Brown's 
warranty that he had made no misrepresentations or omissions in 
connection with the sale of the Interwest business. Thus, evidence 
regarding Brown's knowledge or motives was clearly relevant to that 
particular warranty. 
In a futile effort, Brown somehow argues that the commonality 
of facts underpinning the successful fraud and lack of substantial 
performance defense to Brown's Interwest contract claim and 
Richards' breach of warranty counterclaim must be rejected because 
"the jury found benefit of the bargain damages, even though 
9 
available, were not appropriate for breach of warranty claims." 
Brown Br. at 42. But the special verdict form cited by Brown does 
not indicate (nor was it required to) the jury's rationale behind 
its breach of warranty award. The format of the special verdict 
required the jury to decide Richards' fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation counterclaims and award damages thereon before it 
reached the breach of warranty counterclaim. Moreover, the jury 
was instructed that Richards was not entitled to duplicative 
damages. Thus, it is to be presumed that the fact the jury awarded 
Richards less on his breach of warranty counterclaim than on his 
fraud counterclaim does not suggest that the jury rejected 
Richards' right to benefit of the bargain damages, but only that it 
was following the trial court's instructions to avoid duplicative 
damages. 
Brown's flawed argument on the commonality of the facts 
between Richards' successful breach of warranty claims and the 
equally successful fraud and lack of substantial performance 
defense claims founders in a mass of contradiction and 
inconsistency. Richards made significant reductions for time spent 
on evidence that went to issues for which attorneys fees are not 
recoverable. Under the unquestioned law of the case, Richards was 
not required to eliminate lawyer time simply because it was 
relevant to both fee compensable and non-compensable claims. 
II. CONTRARY TO BROWN'S CONTENTION, RICHARDS, IN APPEALING THE 
DISTRICT JUDGE'S AWARD OF FEES THROUGH TRIAL, APPLIED THE 
CORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW AND MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE. 
Brown contends that Richards' appeal of the trial judge's 
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award of fees through the initial trial must be rejected because 
(1) Richards failed to apply an abuse of discretion standard and 
(2) Richards failed to marshal the evidence. Brown argues the 
wrong standard of review and has categorically failed to 
demonstrate that Richards did not marshal the evidence in support 
of the trial judge's inadequate findings. 
A. Richards Has Applied The Proper Correction of Error 
Standard Of Review. 
At the outset, Brown acknowledges that the standard of review 
regarding entitlement to attorneys fees is correction of error. 
Brown Br. at 35. Richards first challenges the trial judge's award 
of fees for work through trial on the essential premise that Judge 
Rigtrup erred in failing to award Richards fees for his successful 
defenses, including fraud, to Brown's Interwest asset contract 
claim. That is a correction of error standard. Carlie v. Morgan, 
922 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1996). 
Secondly, Richards further challenges the trial judge's 
findings and award of attorneys fees on the premise that 
prejudicial error was committed in awarding only a portion of 
Richards' fees incurred in connection with the affirmative breach 
of warranty claim because of a factual overlap with the fraud 
claim. This issue is also governed by a correction of error 
standard because it raises Richards' entitlement to attorneys fees 
where fee compensable and non-compensable claims share a common 
factual and therefore evidentiary basis. Selvage v. J.J. Johnson 
and Assoc.. 910 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Utah App. 1996). 
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Finally, Richards challenges the trial judge's fee award to 
Richards because the findings and conclusions are insufficient and 
do not support the trial judge's award. Brown acknowledges that 
correction of error is the proper standard of review. 
B. Richards Did Not Fail To Marshal The Evidence In This 
Appeal. 
As an initial matter, the complete absence of factual findings 
by the trial judge and the absence of supporting evidence in the 
record is such that there is no evidence in support of the trial 
court judgment for Richards to marshal. 
Notwithstanding that fact, Brown produced only two witnesses 
on the issue of attorneys fees, namely, George Naegle and Bruce 
Coke. Naegle had experience only as an insurance defense lawyer. 
Even at that, Naegle's testimony did not challenge Richards' 
allocation of fees between fee compensable and non-compensable 
claims. Naegle's testimony concerned block billing requirements of 
insurance companies and was irrelevant to fees awarded in complex 
commercial litigation before the trial court. 
The testimony of Bruce Coke did not begin to support the trial 
court's conclusion that approximately 35% of the total time through 
trial should be allocated to Richards' breach of warranty 
counterclaim. 
One piece of evidence upon which Judge Rigtrup did rely upon 
in his final December 31, 1996 Minute Entry was the evidence of 
David Thompson, an Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal 
Appeals Division. Judge Rigtrup refused to allow Thompson to 
12 
testify on the issue of attorneys fees for lack of experience and 
qualification. Inexplicablyr the trial judge then relied in his 
findings upon the Thompson testimony that he had excluded from 
evidence. Add. C at 5, f 14. 
C. Brown Effectively Concedes That The Trial Court's 
Findings On Attorneys Fees Were As Inadequate As The 
Initial Findings Which Were Set Aside By this Court In 
Brown I, 
Brown attempts to defend the adequacy of the trial judge's 
Findings in support of its fee award by comparing them to the 
findings in Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890 (Utah 1996). 
However, Salmon involved two day-long, single count misdemeanor 
trials where the only challenge to the fee request was that the 
total amount of fees was excessive. The findings adequate to 
support the fee award in Salmon are not comparable to the type of 
findings necessary to support an award of fees in a complex civil 
case. 
A recent case from this Court, Selvage, 910 P. 2d 1252, 
demonstrates the inadequacy of the Findings by the trial judge 
herein. In Selvager the plaintiff prevailed on contract claims, 
for which fees were available, and on non-contract claims for which 
they were not. Plaintiff sought to recover all of its attorneys 
fees. Defendant did not challenge plaintiff's evidence of 
attorneys fees or provide affirmative evidence of what a reasonable 
fee would be for the contract claims but instead argued that 
plaintiff was only entitled to fees for the contract claims and 
should be denied all fees for the failure to allocate between the 
13 
compensable and non-compensable claims. 
Without making any supportive findings, the trial court in 
Selvage awarded approximately 40% of the amount requested. This 
Court reversed for insufficient findings stating: 
[C]onclusory statements do not satisfy the 
requirement that awards of attorneys fees must 
be supported by adequate findings of fact. . . 
.The need for sufficiently detailed findings 
is especially great where, as here, the 
reasonableness of the fee and the supporting 
affidavit were uncontroverted by the opposing 
party. . . .In shortr when reducing an 
uncontroverted fee, "it is necessary that the 
trial court, on the record, identify such 
factors [the factors leading to the reduction] 
and otherwise explain the basis for its sua 
sponte reduction.. . .Vague statements which 
require speculation as to the actual reasons 
behind the ruling are not enough to meet this 
burden. 
Id. at 1265 and n.12. (Emphasis added). This Court also rejected 
defendant's argument that the sufficient findings in support of the 
award could be implied. Id. at 1266 (to imply findings there must 
be clear evidence that the court actually considered and made the 
findings). 
Here, the trial judge failed to address most of the factors 
which this Court instructed it to consider on remand, and made no 
findings whatsoever as to how the factors it considered affected 
the amount awarded. Further, the trial court's findings regarding 
the necessity of the work and the reasonableness of the rates— 
i.e., that the time expended by Richards' attorneys and the 
services rendered were reasonable, and that the rates charged were 
reasonable—support Richards' request for fees, not the amount 
awarded by the trial judge. Addendum C, at 2, ff 1, 2. 
The trial court did not address the difficulty of the work, 
but instead simply concluded that Richards allocated more time to 
pursuit of the breach of warranty claim than is reasonable and fair 
and that "3 5% of the total time expended through trial" would be 
more reasonable. 
The methodology supporting the 35% multiplier is entirely left 
to the guesswork of the parties and this Court. The 3 5% percent 
found compensable on remand is less supported than the trial 
court's initial award of 70% of the total time. In making the 
initial award, the trial court compared the amount of time expended 
on the asset sale issues to the amount of time spent on the 
building sale issues in arriving at the compensable percentage of 
time. On remandr the findings are silent as to how the trial court 
reached the 3 5% figure. The trial court's award must be reversed 
because it is completely unsupported by the Findings and 
Conclusions. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING RICHARDS ONLY 60% OF HIS 
APPELLATE FEES. 
Brown argues the trial court's award of 60% of Richards' fees 
was appropriate because: 1) Richards failed to allocate fees 
incurred among compensable, non-compensable and unsuccessful 
claims; 2) Brown prevailed on many claims; and 3) the main theme of 
Richards' case was fraud. In making these arguments, Brown 
ignores, as did the trial court, this Court's clear holding that 
Richards was the prevailing party on appeal, with the exception of 
one minor issue. Brown If 840 P.2d at 156. 
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Consistent with this Court's direction in Brown If Richards 
omitted from his appellate fee request the time directly allocable 
to the one page of his response/reply brief which was devoted to 
the one issue on which Brown prevailed. R. 4544-45. The remaining 
fees related to compensable issues, and the trial court did not 
find that the amount of time spent on the appeal was unreasonable. 
In the absence of such a finding, the trial court had no choice but 
to follow this Court's direction and award Richards fees for the 
time expended, except on one minor issue on which Brown prevailed. 
IV. RICHARDS WAS ENTITLED TO PEES FOR PROVING FEES. 
In arguing that Richards was not entitled to an award of fees 
incurred in proving his fees, Brown spends a significant part of 
his Brief attempting to distinguish this case from Salmon v. Davis 
County, on which the trial court relied in making its award. As 
importantly, however, Brown completely ignores James Constructors, 
Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 888 P.2d 665 (Utah App. 1994), a 
decision which is directly on point and provides such fees are 
recoverable. 
In James Constructors
 r this Court held that a party was 
"entitled to recover the attorney fees it incurred establishing the 
reasonableness of the fees for which it is entitled to be 
indemnified." Id. at 674 (emphasis added) . This Court made clear 
that this result was required under ordinary contract law 
principles and did not arise from specific indemnity law doctrines. 
Moreover, Salmon also supports the trial court's award of fees 
for proving fees. The underlying rationale of Salmon is that a 
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statutory attorneys fee provision is eviscerated if the party 
cannot recover the fees incurred in proving fees. That rationale 
applies equally to a contractual attorneys fee provision. 
In addition, here, as in Salmon, it was Brownf s conduct on 
remand which increased the cost of determining fees. Richards was 
prepared to submit the matter to the trial court on the basis of 
the detailed billings and pleadings. However, Brown requested an 
evidentiary hearing and then insisted on continuing the examination 
by deposition. Brown insisted on a second evidentiary hearing 
which lasted four full days. At least $25,000.00 of the fees 
requested for proving fees were incurred in connection with the 
deposition and evidentiary hearings. R. 5281-82, 5384, 5403, 6049 
at 62. It is hypocrisy for Brown to argue that it was Richards who 
caused the expenditure of significant sums in establishing the 
reasonableness of fees.5 
Finally, Brown argues Richards should not receive fees for 
proving fees because this Court's remand for calculation of fees in 
Brown I was necessitated by Richards1 failure to allocate fees 
prior to the first appeal. This is absolute nonsense. In Brown If 
this Court remanded Richards1 fee award because of the trial 
court's failure to enter adequate findings and not based upon any 
5Brown also asserts, without citation to the record, that Richards 
spent the entire $79,000 sought for proving fees in attempting to 
allocate between compensable and non-compensable fees. In addition 
to including the fees incurred in evidentiary hearings, the amount 
requested by Richards also includes time spent litigating all of 
the amended judgment and fee issues, including recalculating the 
judgment as instructed by this Court, and responding to the variety 
of motions filed by Brown. 
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inadequacy in Richards1 proof of the reasonableness or 
compensability of fees. Brown 1, 840 P. 2d at 156. Richards is 
entitled to recover attorneys fees for the cost of proving his 
fees. 
V. BROWN IS NOT ENTITLED TO HAVE RECOVERABLE COSTS AND EXPENSES 
REDEFINED BY THE TRIAL JUDGE ON REMAND AFTER THOSE EXPENSES 
HAVE ALREADY BEEN DEFINED AND THE LAW OF THE CASE SETTLED BY 
HIS STIPULATION AND CONSENT IN BROWN I. 
Brown argues that the trial court's new interpretation of the 
term "costs" in the relevant attorneys fees provision to include 
only those costs allowed by Utah R. Civ. P. 54 should be upheld 
because the trial court simply took the opportunity to "correct" its 
earlier "erroneous" ruling. Brown misses the point. The trial 
court is precluded from reconsidering and "correcting" its earlier 
ruling by the law of the case doctrine and by estoppel. Opening 
Br. at 44-45 and n. 11. 
CONCLUSION6 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
RESPONSE BRIEF ON BROWN'S CROSS-APPEAL 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
Many of the issues raised in Brown's Cross-Appeal, such as the 
alleged failure to allocate fees properly, or the argument that 
Richards is not entitled to recover fees incurred in proving fees, 
6See end of Brief, p. 24. 
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have already been fully addressed in the foregoing section of this 
Reply Brief. Therefore, to avoid unnecessary repetition, this 
section will only discuss issues that are unique to the Cross-
Appeal. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST ON 
RICHARDS' ATTORNEYS FEES AWARD. 
Richards did not seek, nor was he awarded, prejudgment 
interest on his attorneys fees. Rather he sought and was properly 
awarded post-judgment interest at the contract rate on his 
attorneys fees from and after October 18, 1990, the date of the 
first Final Judgment. The award of post-judgment interest was 
mandated by this Court's decision in Mason v. Western Mortgage Loan 
Corp., 754 P.2d 984 (Utah App. 1988), and the earlier case, Hewitt 
v. General Tire and Rubber Co., 5 Utah 2d 379, 302 P.2d 712 (Utah 
1956) . 
In Mason, this Court held that when a judgment is modified 
either upward or downward on appeal, it nonetheless bears interest 
from the date of entry of the original judgment. Mason, 754 P.2d 
986. In Hewitt, judgment was entered for plaintiff upon the 
verdict and then set aside by the trial court. On appeal, the Utah 
Supreme Court reversed and ordered that judgment for plaintiff be 
reinstated. On remand, the trial court allowed interest only from 
the date of the reinstated judgment. The Utah Supreme Court again 
reversed and ordered that post-judgment interest should run from 
the date of the original judgment. Hewitt, 302 P.2d 714. 
Brown misreads Mason and this Court's later case, Bailey-Allen 
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Co. v. Kurzetr 876 P.2d 421 (Utah App. 1994), for the proposition 
that "in any case remanded to the trial court, judgment interest 
dates only from the entry of the new judgment." Brown Br. at 26. 
In point of law, Mason held that where a judgment is reversed on 
appeal and entry of judgment is ordered for a different party, 
post-judgment interest runs only from the date of entry of the new 
judgment. In Bailey-Allenr this Court overturned the basis of 
Bailey-Allen's judgment because the Court did not apply the correct 
law and remanded for a redetermination of liability. This Court 
directed that if Bailey-Allen obtained a judgment on a correct 
interpretation of the law, interest could only run from the date of 
that new judgment. 
In Brown I, this Court affirmed the basis of Richards1 award. 
The amount was subject to redetermination, upward or downward, but 
the initial judgment in Richards1 favor remained in place. 
Richards was therefore entitled to and properly awarded post-
judgment interest on his fee and cost award from October 18, 1990, 
the date when judgment was first entered in his favor. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE POST-JUDGMENT RATE IN 
EFFECT ON THE DATE THE INITIAL JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED. 
Brown argues that interest on Richards1 breach of fiduciary 
duty and punitive damage awards should be calculated at 12% from 
October 1990 through May 1993 and thereafter at a different rate 
each year pursuant to the May 3, 1993 amendment to the post-
judgment interest statute. Brown is in error. 
The May 1993 amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4 was 
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specifically modeled on the federal post-judgment interest statute, 
which : ; . . , s^ 
life oi j udgment , ' r n e : nterest rate toi . •. iy part.cuidr 
judgment is to be determined as of the date of the judgment, and 
that is the single rate applicable for the duratioi1 of the interest 
accrual period." Kaiser Aluminum v. Bonjornof 494 U.S. 827, 838-39 
(1990)(emphasis added . This conclusion is reinforced by Utah Rule 
of C:i 54 (eV .•;: n provi . . * . ., r 
decision "from tne \.~\*. :: vis renderec h, .i .r effect 
t hi r in I h o i in i n systeir m Utah * ' «* trie, p^st-judgment 
interest rate .', et rcot a! hp time * i-.- . > • 3 
applied throughout the life of * !> judgment 5* L!-l . 
Alter i iiK] the i i I terest * e ditei tne udgment has bee^ entered 
and after «i rate of ii iterest attaches n it no tes a 
retroactive application of the nev interest rate u: /h is 
ox;.: - .re " ' revised 
statutes is retroactive, unless expressly s^ declared. ode 
Ann f.ft-<_^  Burwell v. Oklahoma Farm Bur. Mut. Ins., 896 P.2d 
1195 * c< * • • ' ridt dfter-
enacted legislation ;or; i destroy :: • : vested or accrued 
rights, the initially applicable statutory rate does not change in 
I U H V e U • : Sartlett v ,. lleversche} 4 96 p.2d 1314, 1318 
(Kan. 1972). 
No remand vn^ ordered with respect t either the breach of 
fj duciai ' "I mii'iqo rio . 'I'll mdamont i n 
Richards1 favcr has been in efiect continually since October 1990 
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and there is no basis to change the post-judgment interest rate on 
May 3, 1993. Interest on Richards1 awards must therefore be 
calculated at the rate of 12% per year from October 1990. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ON 
RICHARDS' BREACH OF WARRANTY DAMAGES. 
Brown contends that Richards is not entitled to prejudgment 
interest on his breach of warranty damages because 1) the warranty 
damages are not the type for which prejudgment interest is 
available, and 2) the original judgment did not provide for such 
interest and Richards did not raise the prejudgment interest issue 
on appeal. Brown's contentions are incorrect. 
First, the breach of warranty award is exactly the type of 
case in which prejudgment interest is allowable. Biork v. April 
Indus.r Inc.r 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah), cert, denied. 431 U.S. 930 
(1977) (pre-judgment interest is appropriate where the damage is 
fixed as of a particular time and the loss can be measured by facts 
and figures); Vasels v. LoGuidicer 740 P.2d 1375 (Utah App. 1987) 
(same). Richards1 breach of warranty damages were fixed as of a 
particular time—April 24, 1984—the effective date of the Asset 
Sale Agreement. Moreover, the formula by which those damages are 
calculated—the difference between the assets as warranted and as 
received—demonstrates that his damages were measured by calculated 
facts. 
Contrary to Brown's arguments, in assessing Richards1 damages, 
the jury was instructed to award damages based on a comparison of 
the value of the assets as received and as warranted. The fact 
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that there was a factual dispute about tn»^» /alues and the amount 
due which . ._<. , . I::] ^ »a] y si s.7 
Brown also clam,- tnat Richards is : * entitled o prejudgment 
interest c hi-- breach •-•• warranty damages because he was not 
awarded prejudgment i \ L L - I ._- :i i t::l 1 = '" l'.;mei t: c LI id :i:i I i .• : I : 
appeal that issue. Richards did no*. i - a i the prejudgment 
int.pr.ist issue because of one obstacle—the initial final judgment 
of the trial court denied recovery altogether contrary to the 
jury's verdict on breach of warranty. Obviously, the issue of 
pre jinlgmenl -.•,..- . : relevant uiu t *••«.- verdict was 
reinstated. However iichards did appeal t
 : ._. breach f warranty 
award generally, and this Court reversed. 
111 * ••*• ' • l * trie specific 
facts of this case, .taei ;.he i m a I j u d g m e M , Bro^i. receives 10% 
prejudgment interest • • repaid contract price. However, the 
jur^ cletc . ..• • -rr in1 y 'Hr , j I "> i\ thn issets 
were worth $100, ..-.>, . t.^ ^ \A\^. the contract price. Unless Richards 
is awarded prejudgment interest on his breach of warranty awardr 
7Brown cites a number of cases in support of his argument that 
prejudgment interest is not appropriate. None apply here. In 
Bellon v. Malnarr 808 P.2d 1089, 1097 (Utah 1991), Bailey-Allen Co. 
v.Kurzetr 240 Utah Ad. Rep. 17, 20 (Utah App. 1994), and Shoreline 
Dev., Inc. v. Utah County, 835 P.2d 207,211 (Utah App. 1992), each 
court found prejudgment interest was inappropriate because it was 
sought on an equitable claim, such as unjust enrichment, and 
prejudgment interest is not generally allowed on equitable claims. 
Richards' breach of warranty claim sounds in express contract, a 
claim for which prejudgment interest has often been awarded. 
Shoreline Dev.
 f 835 P.2d at 211; Bellon, 808 P.2d at 1097. 
Finally, in Price-Orem v. Rawlins, Brown & Gunnellr 784 P.2d 465 
(Utah App. 1989), this Court affirmed the trial court's denial of 
prejudgment interest on an award of lost profits because an award 
of lost profits requires a judgment regarding future events. 
2 3 
Brown will recover 10 years of interest on $100,000 worth of assets 
which he never delivered to Richards. This Court should not permit 
such a rapacious result. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ENTERED A JUDGMENT PROPER IN FORM. 
Brown argues that despite his request, the trial court 
erroneously refused to enter a net judgment in this case. Brown 
never requested a net judgment. The page to which Brown cites 
shows only his request that the trial court decide the attorneys 
fees issue so that a final judgment can be entered. Moreover the 
Post-Appeal Judgment (Post Reconsideration) entered by the trial 
court on March 21, 1998, was prepared by Brown's counsel. Brown 
now cannot claim as error the form of a judgment which he himself 
proposed.8 
CONCLUSION 
Richards has waited a resolution of this case since the return 
of the favorable jury verdict in April 1989. From the time of this 
Court's Decision in Brown I in August 1992, and remand after 
Brown's unsuccessful Certiorari in March 1993, it took the trial 
judge nearly 4 years to settle the satellite issue of attorneys 
fees and enter a judgment on remand, which has now been the subject 
of this second appeal. 
8Bailey Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 945 P.2d 180 (Utah App. 1997), 
cited by Brown, is inapplicable here. In Bailey-Allen, the 
applicable post-judgment interest rate for judgments was the same. 
Here, because some of the claims on which Brown prevailed were 
brought pursuant to the applicable contracts, while the claims on 
which Richards prevailed were both contractual and non-contractual 
claims, different interest rates apply. 
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•ir- ' =e is at hai id to / >.:+ r i r -ar-. * >~ -*• "h° record i i 1 
the trial ^ourt on attorneys fees .-.::.i L - t^-v 
made. Richards requests that this Court remand th..? case viti ^ 
cleat HUMII i*r Mil1 "1. t-rini court modify its earlier judgment -re-
enter detailed findings o: fact based upon t. lie ev . u* nt . .-s: . „ -
already made specifically allocating attorneys fees and awarding 
t.ii--.- Lee . . '"it- of the case. 
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Defendants and Counter Plaintiffs David K. Richards and David K. Richards & 
Co. (collectively "Richards") by their attorneys submit this Memorandum in support of 
their Motion for Entry of Amended Judgment. 
BACKGROUND 
This matter was tried to a jury for eight weeks beginning on February 28, 1989. 
The jury returned, its verdict . . .*- . - -. JI . ,C:,C JUUL::::J 1 
issues except attorneys fees and prejudgment interest on December 21, 1989. Final 
Judgment, incorporating the Court's rulings on prejudgment interest and attorneys fees, 
was enterec ;, uc; . » -: *•"• :>^th parties appealed and the Court of Appeals' 
decision was rendered on August 24, 1992. After the Petition for Writ of Certiorari of 
plaintiffs and counter defendants Boyd J. Brown and Interwest Aviation Corporation 
("Brown") was denied on March 23, . -.*.. .:ic CU^ -L V as remanded to this Court for entry 
of a new judgment consistent with the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals requires that the judgment be amended in 
five areas: :uu::ic:. :.. J - nards and agaii. •* :. .*. * i MI'S 
contract claims under the Interwest Asset Sale and Purchase and Option Agreement 
(Asset Sale Agreement); 2) the purchase price of the Interwest assets must be 
recalculates ..-.. . . . . . . • . . •  .r:...ity claim 11n ist 
be amended to provide for Richards' recovery of the damages awarded by the jury; 4) 
1 
Richards' application for an award of attorneys fees and costs under the Asset Sale 
Agreement for proceedings in this Court must be reconsidered and an amount entered 
which is supported by findings of fact and conclusions of law; and 5) attorneys fees must 
be awarded to Brown for fees incurred, if any, in defending against Richards' efforts to 
rescind contracts other than the Asset Sale Agreement where those contracts provide for 
such fees. Richards' Motion and this Memorandum address the first four issues. 
I. RECALCULATION OF PURCHASE PRICE FOR INTERWEST ASSETS 
According to the Court of Appeals, the purchase price for the Interwest assets is 
to be calculated by subtracting Richards' jury award of $500,000 on the fraud and 
misrepresentation claims from the original purchase price of $900,000 set forth in the 
Asset Sale Agreement, applying payments made to the adjusted purchase price of 
$400,000, calculating interest and then determining what, if any, amount is still due. 
Richards has made this calculation on Exhibit A attached. The dates of payments made 
by Richards, the dates from which interest runs, and the application of those payments 
between the first and second half of the assets are taken from this Court's Final 
Judgment, dated October 16, 1990. As of March 7, 1994, the amount due on the first 
half of the assets is $121,177.08 and the amount due on the second half is $345,416.75 
including prejudgment and postjudgment interest. 
? 
II. RICHARDS IS ENTITLED TO PREJUDGMENT AND POSTJUDGMENT 
INTEREST ON HIS BREACH OF WARRANTY AWARD 
Richards is entitled to prejudgment interest on his breach of warranty award, as 
it represents compensation for damages on which prejudgi nent interest is appropriate: 
[w]here the damage is complete and the amount of the loss is fixed as of 
a particular time, and that loss can be measured by facts and figures, 
interest should be allowed from that time and not from the date of the 
judgment. 
Biork v. April Industries, Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977) cert, denied, 431 U.S. 930 
(1977); see also, Vasels v. LoGuidice, 740 P.2d 1375 (Utah App. 1987). 
The damage to Richards as a result oi brown's breach of warranties contained in 
the Asset Sale Agreement was fixed as of a particular time; i,e at the time the 
Agreement was entered into as of April 24, 1984. Moreover, Richards' damage can be 
measured by facts and figures, Le^ the difference between the assets as warranted and 
as received. See, e.g. Jorgensen * 3 ohti Cla\ and Co., 660 P.2d 229, 233 (Utah 
1983)(prejudgment interest appropriate in breach of contract case). Richards is therefore 
entitled to an award of prejudgment interest from c "Vpril 24, 1984, • :)i:i his bi eaci I of 
warranty award in the amount of $56,630.14 as shown on Exhibit B attached. 
Richards is entitled to postjudgment interest on his breach of warranty award from 
December 23, 1989. . . . 
Richards' favor on that claim. See Hewitt v. General Tire and Rubber Company, 302 
3 
P.2d 712 (Utah 1956)(party who reinstated verdict and judgment in its favor on appeal 
entitled to interest from date of original award). In Hewitt the jury returned a verdict for 
plaintiff and the clerk entered judgment on the verdict. Defendant moved for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, which the trial court granted. On appeal the Utah Supreme 
Court reversed the trial court and reinstated the verdict. On remand the trial court 
refused to award postjudgment interest from the date of the original judgment but instead 
awarded it only from the date of the judgment on remand. Plaintiff appealed again and 
the Supreme Court ordered that interest run from the date of the original judgment, 
reasoning that there was no good reason why plaintiff should lose his interest because 
defendant was able to convince the trial court to make an erroneous ruling. Hewitt, 302 
P.2d at 714. 
Similarly, in this case Richards has had a judgment in his favor on his breach of 
warranty claim since December 21, 1989, but that judgment was in effect set aside by 
the trial court. Because Richards' award was reinstated by the Court of Appeals' 
decision, Richards is entitled to postjudgment interest from December 21, 1989, the date 
the initial judgment was entered, to the present in the amount of $65,987.67 as shown 
on Exhibit B attached. 
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RICHARDS IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNE\5 httb AND COSIS AS 
PREVIOUSLY AWARDED BY THE COURT, AS WELL AS 
SUBSEQUENTLY INCURRED FEES AND COSTS 
After full briefing by the parties and a hearing on the issue, the Court awarded 
Richards $435,000 in attorney s fees ai id costs and awarded Brown $250,000 in fees and 
costs. At the time it announced its decision, the Court outlined in general its reasons for 
awarding these amounts but did not enter any findings and conclusions. The Court of 
Appeals agreed vv ith this Coi 11 t that K ichards is entitled to ai 1 award of fees a v. -; ,i 
the prevailing party on the Asset Sale Agreement. However, the Court of Appeals found 
Richards' award was not supported by factual findings sufficient for appellate review and 
therefore remanded this issi le foi a i ecalculation of tl le a1 : ./ a i :i and ei ltry of suppoi ting 
findings of fact. 
The Court of Appeals directed that attorneys fees be awarded according to the 
process set fo :i Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 
Cottonwood Mall outlines a three part process for determining an appropriate award of 
fees. First, the party seeking the award must produce evidence sufficient to support the 
award. Sect . :-v .. , : • : ; . - -.r; - -*-\-> ^ fees for work d :>ne 
on claims subject to a fee award and work done on claims not subject to a fee award. 
Finally, in determining an appropriate amount the court should consider six factors 
concerning flir n.itiin cif" ihv litigation ami flu," legal services rendered. Id. at 269-70. 
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As demonstrated below, under the Cottonwood Mall analysis, this Court should award 
Richards attorneys fees and costs in the amount of $531,491.01 for work performed 
through March 1990, with postjudgment interest on that amount from October 18, 1990 
to the present in the amount of $179,978.87 and attorneys fees and costs in the amount 
of $46,439.07 for work performed from April 1990 to the present. 
A. Richards Has Provided An Appropriate Evidentiary Basis 
for an Award of Fees and Costs 
Richards submits with this Memorandum the Affidavits of Elizabeth T. Dunning 
and Robert S. Campbell, Jr. Attached to those affidavits are copies of all invoices 
submitted for representation of Richards from the initiation of the litigation through the 
date of this Memorandum. These invoices show each occasion on which work was 
performed in connection with the litigation, the nature of the work performed, the amount 
of time (in tenths of hours) spent on each occasion, the attorney or other law firm 
employee who performed the work and the hourly rate charged for that employee. At 
the end of each invoice the total hours and the total fees for those hours are calculated. 
In addition each invoice shows the total costs advanced and a breakdown of those costs. 
The invoices give the Court the basis for determining what legal work was actually 
performed, as required by Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988), and 
give Brown the opportunity to contest their accuracy, as required by Cottonwood Mall. 
6 
B. Richards Has Apportioned Fees As Required 
Consistent with the requirement of Cottonwood MalL Richards has apportioned 
the fees and costs sought between work : *: . : .:. entitlement to fees and 
work for which there is no entitlement to fees, either because Richards was unsuccessful 
on the claim or because there was no contractual or statutory basis for an award of fees. 
Cottonwood Mall, at 269-70 1 1 le fees ha\ e been appo:.. i.^i .:.- .. -.ou.s: 
1- Factual development and discovery scheduling 
at Basic factual development including witness interviews and 
deposition - *-CJ-. are sougi.. . .;\> because it would 
have been necessary regardless of the specific claims or 
counterclaims asserted. 
b) Scheduling discov ei y No reduction v as made because scheduling 
would have been necessary regardless of the specific content of the 
discovery. 
A mount of fees in this categoi ] • : $12 1, :l 1 1 00 
Reductions made: 0 
Amount of fees sought: $124,414.00 
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2. Preparation of answer and counterclaims 
Most of this work would have been necessary regardless of the specific 
claims or counterclaims. However, consistent with the Court's ruling at the 
time of the original fee award, Richards has reduced the time spent on 
these tasks by 30% to reflect work done on Richards' answer to the claim 
concerning the sale of the second half of the Interwest Building and on 
Richards' claim for breach of fiduciary duty. In addition Richards has 
omitted all time spent doing legal research on the fraud and 
misrepresentation counterclaims. 
Amount of fees in this category: $5,097.50 
Reductions made: 51,762.80 
Amount of fees sought: $3,334.70 
3. Plaintiffs' Discovery 
a) Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories - There were 37 
interrogatories, six of which concerned the Interwest Building and 
the Executive Services Building. Richards therefore reduced the 
time spent answering those interrogatories by 17%. 
b) Plaintiffs First Request for Production of Documents - There were 
19 requests, three of which concerned the Option Agreement 
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(covering the second half of the Interwest building and the Executive 
Services building, including rent on the Executive Services 
bt lilciii ig). R icl lards therefore redi iced the fees incurrec 
responding to those requests by 17%. 
c) Plaintiffs motion to compel answers to tlle Firs Set of 
Interrogatories an :i I ; ii st R eqi lest foi Prodi iction - Ilie sa me 
percentage (17%) was used in reducing time spent on defendants' 
response to the motion to compel as was used with respect to 
responding * :;' • vs First •^•' • • ;*- :..ai*--v m.; \ :~s- :T^viest 
for Production because the motion was directed generallv to all 
responses. 
d) P.ai:!!!:":""' Sec;*r\' ^ *' ' ; n * - ^ ' ^ : V ' - -V. K-. - .is •> n - >:;v::^r 
- There were 56 interrogatories and 21 requests for documents. 
Seven of the interrogatories related to Richards' fraud counterclaim. 
Richards theref'tin1 retinivil iln Mmr incurred in 'responding to 
plaintiffs Second Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production 
of Documents by 9%. 
e) •' Plaintiffs Third Set of Interrogatories - Ail interrogatories 
concerned trial witnesses and exhibits and offers to purchase the 
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Interwest business. The information concerning offers to purchase 
the Interwest business was sought, inter alia, to support Brown's 
claim that the assets were worth what Richards contracted to pay for 
them. A reduction of 30% of the time expended in responding to 
these interrogatories has been made. 
Plaintiffs Third Request for Production of Documents - All requests 
sought documents concerning the operation and finances of the 
Interwest business. Therefore, no reduction has been made. 
Plaintiffs Motion for Order Compelling Discovery (February 1988) 
- The motion generally addresses the Second Set of Interrogatories 
and the Second and Third Requests for Production of Documents. 
Therefore, Richards reduced the time incurred in connection with 
this motion by the same percentage used with respect to the Second 
Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production (9%). 
Motion to compel answers to interrogatories and requests for 
production (June 1988) - The motion addresses eleven 
interrogatories and five requests for production, four of which 
concerned Richards' fraud counterclaim and the Option Agreement. 
10 
Richards has therefore reduced the time incurred in responding to 
the motion to compel by 25%. 
Amount of fees in this category: $23,772.00 
Reductions made: $3,184.15 
Amount of fees sought: $20,587.85 
4. Defendants' Discovery 
a) Defendant's First Request for Production - There were 14 requests, 
one of which specifically addressed the Interwest building. Richards 
therefore reduced time spent on the Request by 7%. 
b) Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories - There were 80 
interrogatories, 49.5 of which related to Brown's claims regarding 
the sale of the North Building and the Executive Services Building. 
Therefore, Richards reduced the time spent in connection with 
defendants' First Set of Interrogatories by 62%. 
Amount of fees in this category: $1,582.00 
Reductions made: $877.50 
Amount of fees sought: $704.50 
11 
5. Plaintiffs Pretrial Motions 
a) Plaintiffs First Motion to Dismiss (June 1987) - Brown's motion 
went to the whole counterclaim and therefore time was reduced by 
30% on the same basis as set forth with respect to the preparation 
of the answer and counterclaim. 
b) Plaintiffs motion to deposit rent into court - All time incurred in 
response to this issue has been omitted. 
c) Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Richards" claim for rescission -
Richards sought rescission as an alternative contract remedy. Under 
the reasoning of the Court of Appeals that a party need not receive 
the full remedy sought to be considered the prevailing party entitled 
to fees, all time spent in connection with this issue is compensable. 
d) Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary judgment concerning the 
Gulfstream Commander - Because the Gulfstream Commander was 
a critical item of proof in Richards' successful defense of Brown's 
contract claims concerning the sale of the business and on Richards' 
breach of warranty counterclaim, all fees incurred in defeating this 
motion are sought. 
12 
e) Plaintiffs Motion in Limine (concerning the testimony of John 
Sharp and Joseph Malagrino) - Because this testimony went to the 
value of the Interwest assets and Richards' breach of warranty claim, 
all fees incurred in defeating this motion are sought. 
f) Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim - This motion addressed 
Richards' entire counterclaim. The motion made the same 
arguments with respect to Richards' fraud and his breach of 
warranty claims because those claims rest on the same factual 
predicate - misrepresentations made by Brown in connection with 
the sale of the Interwest business assets. Because Richards prevailed 
on his breach of warranty claim and on his defense to Brown's 
contract claims on the sale of the Interwest assets through proof of 
those misrepresentations, and because of the common factual 
predicate of the claims, the time has been reduced by 30% as was 
work done on the answer and counterclaim. 
g) Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine concerning business losses - Richards 
was permitted to offer evidence concerning the profitability of the 
Interwest business in 1984 and 1985 and was permitted to offer 
evidence concerning the value of the Interwest business. Therefore 
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no reduction has been made for time expended in opposing Brown's 
motion. 
Amount of fees in this category: $44,468.50 
Reductions made: $9,579.95 
Amount of fees sought: $34,888.55 
6. Damages 
a) Damage calculations - Richards is entitled to fees for work 
performed in connection with his claims of breach of warranty and 
in connection with his proof of the value of the Interwest assets, as 
that issue was essential to Richards' success on his defense of lack 
of substantial performance. Richards has reduced time incurred in 
preparing initial damage calculations by 50%.! 
b) Supplementary answers to damage interrogatories - The same 50% 
reduction was made with respect to work done on supplementary 
answers as was made to earlier work on damage calculations. 
l-The time of Richards' accounting experts, Foote, Passey & Griffin Co., was 
apportioned on the same basis as set forth above on all tasks in which they were 
involved. 
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c) Pre-trial work on damages - Time spent prior to trial discussing and 
preparing various damage calculations has been reduced by 50% on 
the same basis as earlier damage calculations were. 
Amount of fees in this category: $26,060.00 
Reductions made: $13,779.00 
Amount of fees sought: $12,281.00 
7. Defendants' Pretrial Motions 
a) Defendants' Motion to Amend - The motion was made to add to the 
counterclaim the breach of fiduciary duty claim which had been 
made in the original counterclaim and inadvertently omitted from the 
amended counterclaim. This time has been omitted. 
b) Defendants' Motion In Limine (concerning Promissory Notes) - This 
motion concerned four promissory notes, one of which was delivered 
in connection with the sale of the second half of the Interwest 
building and one of which was delivered in connection with the sale 
of the South Building. Therefore time expended in connection with 
this motion has been reduced by 50%. 
c) Motion to Quash Valley Bank Subpoena - Although Brown sought 
the Valley Bank documents on a variety of issues, those documents 
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primarily went to the line of credit issue, which was raised in 
Richards' breach of fiduciary claim, and rental payments on the 
Interwest Building and the Executive Service Building. Therefore, 
time expended in connection with this motion has been omitted 
entirely. 
Amount of fees in this category: $5,336.50 
Reductions made: $3,381.50 
Amount of fees sought: $1,955.00 
8. Jury Instructions and Special Interrogatories 
a) Preparation of special interrogatories to the jury - There were 12 
basic interrogatories submitted in Richards' first proposed set of 
special interrogatories, 8 of which concerned the purchase of the 
second half of the Interwest Building, rent on the Interwest and the 
Executive Services Buildings, fraud, negligent misrepresentation and 
breach of fiduciary duty. Therefore time expended in drafting the 
special interrogatories was reduced by 67%. 
b) Jury instructions - Richards initially submitted 38 proposed jury 
instructions, 15 of which addressed the sale of the second half of the 
Interwest Building, fraud, negligent misrepresentation and breach of 
16 
fiduciary duty. Therefore time expended on preparing the proposed 
jury instructions has been reduced by 40%. 
Amount of fees in this category: SI7.504.50 
Reductions made: $7,818.45 
Amount of fees sought: $9,686.05 
9. General Trial Preparation and Trial 
a) Witness and exhibit list - 3 2 witnesses were listed by Richards. 
Two were experts whose testimony went to the value of the 
Interwest Building and that portion of Richards' damages for which 
he is not seeking fees. Of the 265 documents listed on Richards' 
exhibit list, 22 concern the purchase of the Interwest Building, the 
Executive Services Building and the breach of fiduciary duty claim. 
Richards therefore reduced the time expended in preparation of the 
witness list by 6% and time expended in the preparation of the 
exhibit list by 7%. 
b) Pretrial Order - A 30% reduction in time has been made based on 
the Court's earlier reasoning. 
c) General trial preparation - A 30% reduction has been made. 
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d) Preparation for and testimony of Clayton Perkins - The testimony of 
Mr. Perkins addressed all of Brown's claims under the contract. 
Brown prevailed on his contract claim concerning the sale of the 
second half of the Interwest Building but lost on the first and second 
half of the Interwest assets. In addition, although Brown prevailed 
on his claim for rent he did not prevail with respect to the amount 
sought, the issue to which Mr. Perkins' testimony went. Therefore, 
time expended in preparing to cross-examine and in cross-examining 
Mr. Perkins has been reduced by 30%. 
e) Testimony of Jerry Webber and Dale Jackman - These individuals 
testified concerning the value of the Interwest building. Therefore, 
time expended in preparing and presenting the testimony of Dale 
Jackman and in the cross-examination of Jerry Webber has been 
omitted entirely. 
f) Witness preparation and examination - Other witness testimony was 
predominately relevant to basic factual development and factual 
proof of the claims upon which Richards prevailed or Richards' 
defense to Brown's contract claim on the Interwest assets. Richards 
has therefore reduced time expended in preparing to examine and 
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in examining Richards, Brown, Black, Jardine and Wittke by 30% 
as their testimony went both to the Interwest building and the assets. 
The other witnesses testified concerning the value and condition of 
the assets and no reduction has been made. 
Amount of fees in this category: $286,031.50 
Reductions made: $65,255.15 
Amount of fees sought: $220,776.35 
10. Preparation of Judgment and Related Issues 
Preparation and argument on proposed judgments - There were no disputes 
concerning the form of judgment on the Interwest Building or Executive 
Building. The disputes concerned treatment of Richards' jury verdict on 
the Interwest assets and Brown's contract claim on the Interwest assets and 
the breach of warranty award. Richards ultimately prevailed on both 
issues, which were governed by the Asset Sale Agreement. All time 
incurred is therefore sought. 
Amount of fees in this category: $59,099.50 
Reductions made: 0 
Amount of fees sought: $59,099.50 
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11. Post-judgment Motions 
Richards' Motion was addressed exclusively to issues on which he 
prevailed and is entitled to fees, e ^ proper treatment of the jury's finding 
of no substantial performance by Brown on the Asset Purchase Agreement 
and of the jury's $100,000 award on breach of warranty. Therefore fees for 
all time expended is sought. Brown's postjudgment motion was directed 
exclusively to issues for which fees are not available, e.g. Richards' fraud 
and breach of fiduciary duty verdicts. All time spent in opposing that 
motion has therefore been eliminated. 
Amount of fees in this category: $20,458.00 
Reductions made: $11,390.50 
Amount of fees sought: $9,067.50 
12, Petition for Writ of Mandamus 
This time has been eliminated entirely based on the Court's reasoning at 
the time of the initial fee award. 
Amount of fees in this category: $13,978.50 
Reductions made: $13,978.50 
Amount of fees sought: 0 
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13. Negotiation concerning possible sale of Interwest and other non litigation 
services 
This time has been eliminated. 
Amount of fees in this category: 57,948.00 
Reductions made: $7,948.00 
Amount of fees sought: 0 
14. Attorneys Fees 
Time spent preparing an attorneys fee application is compensable. Donnes 
v. Orlando, 221 Mont. 256, 720 P.2d 233 (1986); Serrano v. Unruh, 652 
P.2d 985 (Cal. 1982). No reduction in the time expended has been made. 
Amount of fees in this category: $26,143.00 
Reductions made: 0 
Amount of fees sought: $26,143.00 
Costs have been apportioned as follows: 
1. Long Distance Telephone Calls - Richards seeks reimbursement for all of 
these amounts. 
Amount of costs in this category: $445.00 
Reductions made: 0 
Amount of costs sought: $445.00 
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2. Filing Fees - Richards seeks reimbursement for all of these amounts. 
Amount of costs in this category: $235.00 
Reductions made: 0 
Amount of costs sought: $235.00 
3. Witness Fees - Richards seeks reimbursement for all of these amounts, 
including amounts charged for service of subpoenas, as the witnesses 
appearing by subpoena primarily testified in connection with compensable 
issues. 
Amount of fees in this category: $955.40 
Reductions made: 0 
Amount of fees sought: $955.40 
4. Photocopies - Richards has reduced photocopy costs incurred through 
December 1988 by 30%. A review of the bills indicates that at no time did 
the noncompensable portion of attorney time which generated significant 
copy charges rise above this amount. From January through April 1989, 
copying costs were reduced by 7%, the figure used with respect to 
apportioning time on the exhibit list, because copies in that period were 
primarily generated by preparation and distribution of trial exhibits. 
Copying charges were eliminated on the bill dated September 25, 1989 
because most copies were made in connection with the petition for writ of 
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mandamus. Copying charges were reduced by 50% on the bill dated March 
15, 1990 to eliminate charges in connection with opposing Brown's 
postjudgment motions. On some bills photocopy costs are broken out 
separately. In other cases, the photocopy costs comprise the 
"miscellaneous" or "other" costs category. In that instance, counsel 
attempted to separate out noncompensable, noncopying costs and then 
reduced the remainder by the appropriate percentage. 
Amount of costs in this category: $3,990.81 
Reductions made: $410.54 
Amount of costs sought: $3,580.27 
5. Miscellaneous costs - As noted above, the appropriate percentage was 
deducted from copying costs contained in this category and 
noncompensable costs were deducted. Other miscellaneous costs, reduced 
if appropriate by the amounts shown on the individual invoices, were 
included in this category. 
Amount of costs in this category: $11,763.83 
Reductions made: $1,116.32 
Amount of costs sought: $10,647.51 
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6. SOS Temporary Services - The same deduction used with respect to 
photocopy charges has been applied here because the temporary services 
were used in connection with copying jobs. 
Amount of costs in this category: $11.11 
Reductions made: $3.32 
Amount of costs sought: $7.79 
The invoices submitted have been highlighted in yellow to show time entries 
which were eliminated entirely because time was spent on noncompensable work (e.g. 
a claim for which there is no right to recover attorneys fees or on which Richards lost) 
and in blue to show time entries which have been reduced because some portion of the 
time spent was on noncompensable work. In addition time entries for which 
compensation is being sought on Richards' Application for Attorneys Fees and Costs 
Incurred on Appeal have been highlighted in pink and are not included in this fee 
application. The percentage reduction and time subtracted in tenths of hours is noted 
next to the original time entry. A summary sheet attached to each bill shows the fees 
and costs billed, fees and costs reduced or omitted, and the total fees and costs sought. 
The following summarizes fees and costs incurred and sought by Richards from 
the beginning of the case through his first fee application in April 1990 and from April 
1990 through October 30, 1993: 
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March 1987 to March 30, 1990 
Fees Incurred 
$618,447.50 
Costs Incurred 
$69,681.70 
Total Incurred 
$688,129.20 
April 1990 to October 31, 1993 
Fees Incurred 
$43,446.00 
Costs Incurred 
$3,665.10 
Total Incurred 
$47,111.10 
Fees Requested 
$479,986.00 
Costs Requested 
$51,505.01 
Total Requested 
$531,491.01 
Fees Requested 
$42,777.00 
Costs Requested 
$3,662.07 
Total Requested 
$46,439.07 
Based upon the reductions for noncompensable time shown on the invoices 
submitted, Richards is entitled to an award of fees and costs for work billed through 
March 1990 in the amount of $531,491.01 plus interest and an award of fees and costs 
for work billed from April 1990 to October 30, 1993 in the amount of $46,439.07. 
C. The Fee Award Sought By Richards Is Supported by The Factors 
Which the Court Is Directed to Consider 
Cottonwood Mall directs courts to consider six specific factors in determining an 
appropriate fee award: 
1. the difficulty of the litigation; 
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2. the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case; 
3. the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case; 
4. the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services; 
5. the amount involved in the case and the result attained; and 
6. the expertise and experience of the attorneys involved. 
830 P.2d at 269. 
The first and third factors listed - the difficulty of the litigation and the 
reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case - are related. As the Court is 
aware, this was an extremely complex case, requiring an eight week jury trial during 
which 34 witnesses were called (a number of them three or more times), expert witness 
testimony on a number of sophisticated appraisal and valuation issues was offered, 
approximately 450 exhibits were introduced and a number of difficult legal issues were 
briefed and argued. The amount in controversy exceeded $5,000,000. The number of 
hours expended reflect all of these factors.2 
2As further evidence of the reasonableness of the number of hours expended by 
Richards' counsel, Richards notes that counsel for Brown expended 5,144.68 hours 
during the course of this litigation. Plaintiffs Trial Brief Related to the Issues of 
Interest, Attorney's Fee and Costs dated April 5, 1990 at 31-32. Richards' counsel 
expended only 4,364 hours for litigation activities. If paralegal hours are added, the total 
for Richards is 4,819. 
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The next factor - the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case - is 
demonstrated by the staffing of the case. Throughout the pretrial proceedings two 
attorneys handled the case. On almost no occasions did both attorneys attend depositions 
or other discovery proceedings. Similarly, following the end of the discovery phase, the 
same three attorneys handled the case through trial preparation, trial and post trial 
proceedings.3 The addition of a third attorney for trial preparation and trial permitted 
much of the legal research and writing and document analysis to be done at a 
significantly lower hourly rate than if either of the more senior attorneys had done it. 
Paralegal assistance was used whenever possible to control cost. 
The fourth and sixth factors to be considered - the fee customarily charged in the 
locality for similar services and the expertise and experience of the attorneys involved -
are also related because to a great extent the hourly rates charged are a reflection of the 
experience and expertise of the attorneys involved. The hourly rates charged for this 
litigation are the regular hourly rates for the attorneys involved and the same rates 
charged for work on other complex, commercial litigation, as set forth in the Affidavits 
of Robert S. Campbell, Jr. and Elizabeth T. Dunning. The hourly rates are reasonable 
3Elizabeth T. Dunning was assigned to the case in place of Frank N. Smith, the 
attorney who handled pretrial proceedings, after Mr. Smith left Watkiss & Campbell to 
accept an inhouse counsel position in Nevada. 
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for attorneys with the levels of experience and expertise of Richards' attorneys, as 
detailed in their Affidavits. 
The final factor - the amount involved in the case and the result attained - also 
support the fee award requested by Richards. As noted above, the amount at stake based 
upon Brown's claimed damages was over $5,000,000. Richards was successful in 
defeating all but $1,000,000 of those claims and obtaining a recovery of $950,000 on his 
own claims, plus entitlement to the award of attorneys fees at issue. 
For the reasons set forth above Richards' application for fees provides the 
necessary basis for an award of fees and costs in the amount of $577,930.08 plus 
appropriate interest, pursuant to the standards of Cottonwood Mall. 
D. Richards Is Entitled to Postjudgment Interest from 
October 18, 1990 on the Award of Fees 
The Court should also award Richards postjudgment interest at 10 percent on its 
fee award for work done through March 30, 1990 from October 18, 1990 to the present 
because the Court found Richards to be the prevailing party on the Asset Purchase 
Agreement and therefore entitled to a fee award at the time it entered its Final 
Judgment on October 18, 1990. The Court of Appeals affirmed this Court's decision 
that Richards was the prevailing party, entitled to a fee award, but vacated the amount 
of the award because of the absence of sufficient factual findings to support of the 
award. Richards is therefore entitled to postjudgment interest on those fees incurred up 
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to the time of his original fee application from the time that the original judgment in his 
favor awarding him fees was entered. 
In Mason v. Western Mortgage Loan Corp., 754 P.2d 984 (Utah App. 1988), the 
court addressed the computation of interest on an award entered following an appeal. In 
Mason, plaintiff lost in the trial court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, and 
remanded for entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff. On remand, the trial court entered 
judgment in plaintiffs favor and awarded interest from the date of the original judgment 
in defendant's favor. Defendant then appealed, arguing interest should have been 
awarded only from the date of the new judgment. On appeal, the court reversed again, 
holding that when a judgment is reversed, and entry of judgment for another party 
ordered, interest should run only from date of the new judgment. However, in its 
opinion, the Court of Appeals distinguished the situation where a party retains its 
judgment or right to judgment, but the amount is modified upward or downward: 
A judgment bears legal interest from the date of its entry in the trial court 
even though it is still subject to direct attack. When a judgment is 
modified upon appeal, whether upward or downward, the new sum draws 
interest from the date of entry of the original order, not from the date of the 
new judgment. 
Mason v. Western Mortgage Loan Corp.. 754 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah App. 1988) (quoting 
Stockton Theatres. Inc. v. Palermo, 55 Cal.2d 439, 360 P.2d 76, 11 Cal.Rptr. 580 
(1961)); see also, Hewitt v. General Tire and Rubber Co.. 5 Utah 2d 379, 302 P.2d 712 
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(1956) (party who obtains reinstatement of verdict and judgment in its favor on appeal 
is entitled to interest from date of original award). 
Richards is therefore entitled to postjudgment interest on the requested award of 
$531,491.01 for work billed through March 30, 1990 in the amount of $179,978.87 as 
shown on Exhibit C attached. 
E. Richards Is Entitled to An Additional Award of Fees For Work Done 
After the Fee Application of April 5, 1990 
In addition to the fees for work performed through the date of Richards' fee 
application (April 5, 1990), the Court should award Richards fees incurred in 
compensable activities after the date of the previous Application. Those compensable 
activities include: 1) finalizing the fee application and supporting bills, responding to 
Brown's fee application and argument on Richards' Application for Fees in April and 
May 1990, 2) preparation of the final judgment at the request of the Court and continuing 
negotiation and litigation concerning the form of the final judgment, including litigation 
initiated by Brown concerning supplementing the judgment in January and February 
1991, and 3) preparation of Richards' Motion to Enter Amended Judgment and of this 
Memorandum in Support of that Motion. 
Invoices which show the time incurred from April 1990 through November 1993 
are submitted with counsel's affidavits. The invoices provide the detailed evidentiary 
basis required for an award of fees. 
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No reduction in the fees incurred since April 5, 19904 has been made for work 
done in connection with Richards' fee application because this Court agreed with 
Richards' contention in his initial Fee Application that Richards was the prevailing party 
on the Asset Sale Agreement and the Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. Time 
spent preparing and arguing a fee application is compensable. Fees are sought for time 
spent opposing Brown's request for attorneys fees because Brown argued that he was the 
sole prevailing party and Richards was not entitled to any fee award. Richards' 
opposition to Brown's fee request therefore vindicated a right promised to Richards in 
the Asset Sale Agreement. 
No reduction in time spent in preparing, negotiating and litigating the Final 
Judgment has been made. This Court requested counsel for Richards to prepare the final 
judgment incorporating the Court's rulings on prejudgment interest and attorneys fees. 
This time should therefore be fully, rather than partially, compensable. 
4The invoices submitted with Richards' initial fee application reflected most time and 
costs incurred through March 31, 1990, although a few March time entries were not 
billed until the April Campbell Maack & Sessions bill and one January entry was not 
billed until the November Watkiss & Saperstein bill. The invoices for work done in the 
first few days of April before the original Fee Application was actually submitted to the 
Court were not available at the time the original Fee Application was submitted. That 
time is included here. 
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No reduction has been made for time spent in litigating Brown's efforts to 
supplement the judgment in January 1991 because Richards defeated that motion and the 
time was necessarily spent to respond to Brown's motion. 
The total time spent in the categories described above on pages 8-22 from March 
30, 1990 through November 30, 1990 was: 
Preparing for and arguing fee application 
and preparing this request for fees (Category 14) 231.7 hours 
Preparing final judgment, litigating 
motion to supplement judgment and preparing 
motion to amend judgment (Category 10) 156.6 hours 
The amount of time spent on each activity was reasonable given the complexity 
of the litigation, as discussed above. The rates charged Richards continue to be the rates 
regularly charged by the attorneys for complex commercial litigation and are reasonable 
for their experience and expertise. 
Richards is therefore entitled to an award of fees and costs in the amount of 
$46,439.07 for work billed from April 1990 through October 30, 1993. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above Richards requests that the Court enter an Amended 
Final Judgment making the following changes and additions: 
1. Amend Section I, paragraph 1 on Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action to enter 
judgment for Richards and against Brown; 
32 
2. Amend Section I, paragraph 2 on Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action to enter 
judgment for Richards and against Brown; 
3. Amend Section 1, paragraph 3 on Plaintiffs' Sixth Cause of Action to enter 
judgment for Richards and against Brown; 
4. Amend Section III, paragraph 1 on Richards' First Counterclaim to reflect the 
purchase price of $900,000, the jury's award of $500,000, and the payments, interest 
accruals and balance due set forth on Exhibit 1; 
5. Amend Section III, paragraph 4 on Richards' Third Counterclaim to enter 
judgment for Richards in the amount of $100,000, plus $56,630.14 in prejudgment 
interest and $65,987.67 in postjudgment interest; 
6. Amend Section IV, paragraph 16 on Attorneys Fees and Costs to award 
Richards $531,491.01 for fees and costs incurred prior to April 5, 1990, plus $179,978.87 
in postjudgment interest and to award Richards $46,439.07 for fees incurred in the 
district court after April 5, 1990, plus any fees incurred from the submission of this 
Memorandum until the entry of judgment. 
DATED this [ ^ d a y of April, 1994. 
Robert S. Campbell, Jr. H ( \ 63^3 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
One Utah Center, 13th Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Elizab^uKT. Dunning 
Carolyn Cox 
WATKISS DUNNING & WATKISS 
Broadway Centre, Suite 800 
111 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2304 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Counter Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I herewith certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of 
WATKISS DUNNING & WATKISS, Broadway Centre, Suite 800, 111 East Broadway, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, and that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5 Utah Rules Civil 
Procedure, a true copy of the attached MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR ENTRY OF AMENDED JUDGMENT (CORRECTED) were hand delivered to the 
following-named individual: 
Bruce E. Coke, Esq. 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
on this jSh day of April, 1994. 
(AfAlJf' OfAiJ 
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Exhibit A 
BROWN V. RICHARDS 
COMPUTATION OF BALANCE DUE ON 
SECOND HALF OF BUSINESS ASSETS 
FROM TO DAYS PAYMENT 
01-Feb-85 25-Oct-85 266 $30,534.65 
25-Oct-85 Ol-Apr-86 158 23,159,25 
424 $53,693.90 
PRINCIPAL BALANCE 
PRE JUDGEMENT INTEREST AT 10% 
Ol-Apr-86 20-Dec-89 1359 DAYS 
INTEREST ON LATE QUARTERLY 
PAYMENTS THROUGH DECEMBER 20, 1989 
POST JUDGEMENT INTEREST AT 10% 
20-Dec-89 07-Mar-94 1538 DAYS 
DAILY INTEREST $66.58 
INTEREST PRINCIPAL BALANCE 
$200,000.00 
$14,575.34 $15,959.31 184,040.69 
7,966.69 15,192.56 168,848.14 
$22,542.04 $31,151.86 
$168,848.14 
62,867.02 
11,301.64 
243,016.79 
102,399.95 
$345,416.75 
BROWN V. RICHARDS 
COMPUTATION OF BALANCE DUE ON 
FIRST HALF OF BUSINESS ASSETS 
FROM TO DAYS PAYMENT 
23-Apr-84 
Ol-May-84 
06-Jul-84 
10-Oct-84 
15-Jan-85 
24-Apr-85 
15-Jul-85 
31-Jul-85 
25-Oct-85 
Ol-May-84 
06-Jul-84 
10-Oct-84 
15-Jan-85 
24-Apr-85 
15-Jul-85 
31-Jul-85 
25-Oct-85 
02-Apr-86 
8 
66 
96 
97 
99 
82 
16 
86 
159 
$18,000. 
34,200, 
10,125, 
10,125. 
10,125. 
10,125, 
45,000, 
9,000, 
18,225. 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
709 $164,925,00 
PRINCIPAL BALANCE 
PRE JUDGEMENT INTEREST AT 10% 
02-Apr-86 Ol-Jul-90 1551 DAYS 
INTEREST ON LATE QUARTERLY PAYMENTS 
THROUGH JULY 1, 1990 
POST JUDGEMENT INTEREST AT 10% 
Ol-Jul-90 07-Mar-94 1345 DAYS 
DAILY INTEREST $24.26 
INTEREST PRINCIPAL BALANCE 
$0.00 
3,290.96 
3,973.90 
3,851.83 
3,761.10 
2,972.28 
548.60 
1,901.39 
3,206.14 
$18,000.00 
30,909.04 
6,151.10 
6,273.17 
6,363.90 
7,152.72 
44,451.40 
7,098.61 
15,018.86 
$200,000.00 
182,000.00 
151,090.96 
144,939.86 
138,666.68 
132,302.78 
125,150.06 
80,698.67 
73,600.06 
58,581.20 
$23,506.20 $141,418.80 
$58,581.20 
24,893.00 
5,073.62 
88,547.82 
32,629.26 
$121,177.08 
Exhibit B 
BROWN V. RICHARDS 
COMPUTATION OF INTEREST ON 
BREACH OF WARRANTY CLAIM 
JUDGEMENT $100,000.00 
PRE JUDGEMENT INTEREST AT 10% 
24-Apr-84 20-Dec-89 2066 DAYS 56,602.74 
156,602.74 
POST JUDGEMENT INTEREST AT 10% 
20-Dec-89 07-Mar-94 1538 DAYS 
DAILY INTEREST $42.90 65,987.67 
$222,590.41 
Exhibit C 
BROWN V. RICHARDS 
COMPUTATION OF INTEREST ON 
RICHARD'S ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
FEES AND COSTS §531,491.01 
POST JUDGEMENT INTEREST AT 10% 
ia-Oct-90 07-Mar-94 1236 DAYS 
DAILY INTEREST $145.61 179,978.87 
$711,469.88 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 21, I hereby 
certify that two copies of the attached REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
AND RESPONSE BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLEES were served upon the 
following: 
Bruce E. Coke, Esq. 
John W. Call, Esq. 
NYGAARD COKE & VINCENT 
3 33 North 3 00 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
by depositing a properly addressed envelope containing the same in 
the U.S. mail, postage prepaid, on this^p^_ d aY o f October, 1998. 
C:\MyFiles\Richards\CertificateofService.wpd 
